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ABSTRAC T 
The primary probl em of this s t udy is to clarif y  
Sartre's conce pt of praxis a s  a proje c t ive action of human 
cons ciousnes s  which creates  history and makes it int el l igible. 
I foc us on Sartre's attempt to combine an e xis t ential 
humanis m with a the ory of his t ory as a progr e s s ive movement 
generated by individual actors , their s ocial groups , a nd 
their environm e ntal s urroundings . Sartre's Critique 
provide s  the phil osophical bas is for unders tanding s ocial 
institutions and beha vior, and des cribes human action as 
a compl e x  total ity c ompr is ing free s ubje c t ivity and its 
unavoidabl e e nvironment . 
This inquiry foc us e s  on t he e xist e nt ial root of 
Sartre 's theory of his tory and the probl e matic nature of 
his pos ition. Al t hough he all ocates priority to an act or's 
cons c iousnes s  and actions , his explanat ion, at times,  is 
vague a nd unconvincing. W hil e he e mphas izes human freedom 
he ina dvertly illustrates the enormous influence of a 
material world which is beyond our control . 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jean-Paul Sartre , in his later works , tries to 
synthesize his existentialist view of human freedom with 
a theory of his tory. Believing Marxism to be a humanist 
phil osop hy , he interprets Marxist social theory in terms 
of existential ism. 1 The Marxis t theory favored by Sartre 
is that o f  the young, Hegel ian Marx, who ins is ted that man 
makes his tory , and is conditioned by his external environment. 
Sartre hopes to prove that history is existentially intell i­
gible. Although ma n is affected by his circumstances , he , 
not matte r ,  is the propelling force of his tory. The 
following thesis is a study of human praxis and its 
relationship to our comprehe nding and creating his tory . 
In reply to accusations that existential ism is a 
phil os ophy of anxiety , Sartre counte rs in " Existe ntialis m 
is a Humanism, " originally delivered in Paris in 1945 ,  that 
existe ntialism is the thought of human s ubjectivity .  
"Existentialis m's first move is t o  make every man aware of 
what he is and to make the full responsibility of his 
exis tence rest on him."2 Subjectivity means that "an 
1sartre manifests this intention especially in the 
Search for a Me thod , trans . Hazel Barns , New York, Vantage 
Books ed. 1968. Hereafter this book is referred to as SFM 
and future page references will appear in parentheses in the 
main body of the text. 
2Jean-Paul Sartre , "Existential is m is a Humanism" in 
Exis tential ism ve rs us Marxis m,  ed . George Novack ,  New York , 
Dell Publ is hing C o. , Inc., Delta Books ed. 1966 , p. 7 4 
1 
2 
individual chooses and makes himself." J Sartre ins ists that 
"it is impos sible for man to trans cend human s ubjectivity."
4 
Man is abs olutely free. He chooses not only hims elf but 
als o  for all his fellow men bas ed on his own need. As the 
creator of his tory , through his own activity he chooses his 
world. This is his s ubjectivity. 
Oppos ing both total reason (spirit) and total material­
ism ,  Sartre takes the middle ground. Marx had disagreed 
with Hegel's view that the dialectic of history was 
primarily spiritual. His dialectic was rather a function 
of matter. For Sartre the dialectical force of matter is 
defined by man's conscious ness of it . Matter its elf cannot 
comprehend the dialectic and if the s ubject of the dialectic 
cannot comprehend this , there is , for Sartre, no dialectic 
at all. However , without matter man has no ground for 
dialectical action. The dialectic is the movement its elf 
as well as the method of comprehens ion of that movement. 
The subject himself is not only a creator of the movement 
but also an agent of the comprehens ion of the movement as 
a whole. Sartre's historical materialism asserts that matter 
lies in a dialectical process only through human intervention 
in history. I n  this s ense the matter is the external 
condition of man's own dialectic. Becaus e man cannot develop 
his exis tence in his tory without the mediation of matter , 
matter also shares the s ubjective rule of dialectical 
proces s .  Nevertheles s ,  for Sartre, the effects of the 
J 
mediation depend only on man's understanding of that 
mediation. 
As a humanist ,  Sartre remarks that man is the maker of 
his own history and a free agent in making his tory intelli-
gible. As a s ocial s c ientist he de c lares that man integrates 
his circumstances to create history in relation to other 
men and matter. In his Critique of Dialec tical Reason , 
Sartre tries to combine the s e  positions with a theory of the 
inte lligibility of history. He seeks to harmonize his 
humanist ontology with s c ientific historical s ocial theory. 
Sartre attempts to make the intelligibility of human 
history more concrete by dealing with several questions. 
What , he asks , is history in a humanist and practical sens e ?  
Under what c onditions can it b e  comprehended? And by what 
means can it be understood? The task of his Critique is 
to s how "the fundamental identity between individual life 
and human history • • •  the identity of these two totalising 
processes must itself be proved.5 
The Critique is a study of the relationship of man to 
the s urrounding world. I t  is a study of how a free individual 
makes his exis tence meaningful without los ing his ontological 
freedom. Man is constrained by his lifetime relationship 
with his environment , unles s  he is totally is olated like 
5Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reas on ,  
trans . Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed. Johathan R�e , London , NLB,  
197 6 .  Hereafter this book is refereed t o  a s  CRD, and future 
page references will appear in parentheses in the main 
body of the text. 
4 
Robison Crus oe . Despite the se constraints ,  however, Sartrre 
believes that an individual integrates his circumstances,  
including the relationship with other men, into his own 
existence. This integration is by the individual's 
dialectical interaction with his s urrounding. This method 
serves to connect him internally with objects .  The 
synthesized meaning of history is poss ible by the totalizing 
activity of man's own activity in the conte xt of surrounding 
conditions . Insofar as an individual realizes this internal 
bond within s ocial relationships he finds himse lf a part 
of the process of history and a s ubjective agent of the 
comprehe ns ion of that history. 
I will now examine the nature of diale ctical reason, 
praxis as human labor in s ocial relations , the internal 
and external relationship between man and his environment, 
constituted praxis of a group as s ocial activity toward 
history, and the dialectical intelligibility of history . 
Sartre presents dialectical reason as the method of 
comprehending his tory. No affairs of state in this world 
can be e xplained as merely causal relationships between 
events occuring in sequence . For the present is itself the 
total of what has be en and what s hall be . Man is a 
participant in the dialectical process and as s uch can 
comprehe nd it only from within. There can be no detached 
objective observation. This is the subject of chapter I. 
The Critique is the study of what man ' s  role is in 
history and how this role is developed in relation to 
5 
material conditions and with other man. The concept of 
praxis is the fundamental thes is of Sartre ' s  s ocial theory. 
Praxis is human labor in the world to satisfy perceived 
needs. Man realizes the scarcity of what he wants , develops 
a proj ect to achieve it, and interiorizes the external 
conditions along.with the project. Praxis is , as Sartre 
defines it in the Search for a Method, not mere action , but 
purpos eful human activity directed by the project. This 
is carefully e xamined in chapter II. 
A ccording to Sartre's theory of history this scarcity 
is the s tarting point of human interaction. There is not 
enough of anything in the world to meet the needs of 
everyone. Each pers on wants objects that are des ired by 
others. The need for the s carce obj ect is the origin of 
human activity. Complete satisfaction is imposs ible. Whe n  
the first need is satisfied,  new needs appear in a n  endless 
s ucces sion. This is the beginning of interaction between 
men, and between man and his world. Totalization is the 
movement towards a human proj e ct that fulfills the needs of 
this scarcity. The individual recognizes himself through 
his consciousness of things and other people which arises 
from his struggle to alleviate his perce ption of scarcity. 
The important concept of totalization is examined in 
chapter III. 
The effect of scarcity on human relations and the 
efforts to overcome it are therefore the bas is of human 
socialization. Man is alienated by material conditions and 
6 
by people, and everyone is deemed a threat to life. In 
this state there is no humanity. The serial individual 
escapes from his seriality through cooperation within the 
group. A group is formed from the desire to regain human 
freedom through a common effort to overcome individual 
alienation. Men sharing the same project create a common 
praxis to accomplish their individual projects. Insofar 
as each individual separates his life from everyone else's, 
there is no shared project. Group activity, for Sartre, 
is both the beginning of humanity and the motive force of 
history. Group praxis is the subject of the fourth chapter. 
The action and reaction between agents of totalization, 
within groups in society, is the driving force of history. 
Toward the end of the Critique, Sartre sees contemporary 
capitalist society as isolating man from humanity. Sartre 
challenges material determinism and Marxist revolutionary 
solutions by the victory of one class against another. 
For Sartre not only the working class but also the bourgeoi­
sie are the agents of history's dialectical process. The 
struggle itself, not the victory of the proletariat in the 
struggle, is the motive force of history. Sartre concludes 
that there is no completion of totalization because the 
process itself is dialectical, continuously connecting 
past and future. Only through this constant struggle is 
man able to comprehend history. The intelligibility of 
history is examined in chapter V. 
This study focuses on Sartre's conceptualization of 
7 
praxis as the subject of the dialectical progression of 
history, and its role within that dialectic. Though Sartre 
provides a humanistic basis to view history, weaknesses of 
his theory of history are also caused by the persistent 
claim of the absolute freedom of the subject within all 
interaction with his environment. This study is to 
ascertain how Sartre determines that continuous movement of 
history which is based on human activity and to discover 
whether or not his proposed intelligibility is reasonable. 
CHAPTER I 
DIALECTICAL REASON AND ITS INTELLIGIBILITY 
For Sartre, dialectical materialism is the only way 
to explain human history. If the historical movement is 
not dialectical and if the development is not understood 
by dialectical reasoning, there is no history at all. To 
prove that a dialectic exists, "it must be proved that a 
negation of a negation can be an affirmation, that 
conflicts--within a person or a group--are the motive force 
of History, that each moment of a series is comprehensible 
on the basis of the initial moment, though irreducible 
to it, ( and ) that History continually effects totalisations 
of totalisations • • • •  " ( CRD 15 ) This is the task of 
Sartre's social theory in the Critique. 
Among the many theorists of the dialectic, Sartre has 
been influenced most by Hegel. The basis of Hegel's 
dialectic is his assertion that every action of nature and 
man developes systematically. All interaction begins 
within a given situation under already established conditions, 
conditions which conflict with efforts to change them to 
more desirable ones. The combination of change and 
resistance forms a new unity. The two previous stages are 
absorbed into a third and new condition, which does not 
end the process but merely becomes the first stage of 
8 
yet another dialectic. This is not an unchanging cycle. 
Rather, "it is a development in quantity punctuated now 
9 
and then by a qualitative change, a "leap" from one quality 
level to a higher quality level. This dialectical 
t h · t f 1 · t · "
6 
Although movemen as no po1n o cu m1na 1on: • • • • 
the apparent form of movement is as cyclical as Hegel's 
concept of "thesis, " "anti-thesis" and "synthesis, " every 
dialectic varies in content as it varies in time. In 
Sartre's words the "transition from one state to another 
is always a process of enrichment. "
? 
Although Hegel serves as the major influence for 
Sartre, it is necessary to contrast the Hegelian dialectic 
with that of Marx for one to fully understand Sartre's 
position. 
For Hegel history is the process of self-development 
of the World Spirit.
8 
The driving power of the dialectic 
is Spirit, which is defined as divine Providence. 9 There 
are two realms of this dialectic, one of nature and one of 
Spirit. Nature is also a rational system but the realm 
6
walter Odajnyk, Marxism and Existentialism, New York 
Doubleday & Company, Inc. , Anchor Books ed. 1965, p. 6. 
7Jean-Paul Sartre, "Marxism and Revolution", in 
Existentialism versus Marxism, ed. George Novack, New York, 
Dell Publishing Co. Inc. , 1966, p. 98. 
8
Georg l.t'l. F. Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Revert s. 
Hartman, New Yor, N Y, The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. , 1954. 
As an introduction of the Philosophy of History, Hegel shows 
here the concept of Reason as a solution to the dialectic 
of the universal and the particular. 
9Ibid., p. 14. 
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of the dialectic of nature cannot be thought independently 
of its relationship to Spirit. Without the interrelation­
ship there is no dialectical progress in nature. Spirit 
is not mere human consciousness although it is brought 
about in man, but a superior power which unfolds dialectic, 
world history. Spirit is the dynamic of history, as a 
totality of men and nature and their interaction. Therefore 
the point of historical synthesis is that of actualization 
of the Spirit through its materialized form, which 
Hegel believes to be the nation state. Only at the point 
of actualization, only when Spirit appears by itself in 
a materialized form can man experience absolute freedom. 
In other words, for Hegel, history is a predetermined 
process initiated by one absolute force. Neither man nor 
material world (nature) can go toward their conscious 
end, but they are only directed to the goal of the World 
Spirit as the absolute good. 
Marx explains history as a dialectic. Even though 
he accepts the logic of the dialectic, he cannot agree 
with the explanation that every action is spiritually 
governed. For Marx the dynamic of history is action, 
man's labor. Man is what he does. The action is character­
ized by working on matter to produce useful things to 
meet human needs. This action is then influenced by its 
fruits, its products. According to I/larxist materialism, 
man is a part of nature. Everything including law, social 
classes and man's brain is reduced to rna tter. r.1an' s 
consciousness is the product of matter. It is merely the 
product of the environment to which he belongs. History 
11 
is understood as a process in which man acts on nature to 
transform it to meet his needs, and nature in turn influences 
man. Man's consciousness is entirely dependent on his 
social position. Outside of his class he has no individual 
perspective. The materialist view further differs from 
Hegelian idealism in that the relationship between man 
and matter is characterized by the material determinism of 
man's praxis. Man does not make nature a part of the 
dialectic through his interaction with it. Rather nature 
determines man's existence. 
Sartre contends that reason is neither idealistic nor 
materialistic. He is convinced that the Hegelian view of 
the comprehensibility of the dialectic through Spirit is 
not the way to prove the intelligibility of the dialectical 
development of history. There is no absolute power to 
create history. Believing in no absolute power such as 
God, Sartre argues that man creates the world by himself. 
Sartre also believes that the driving power of history is 
man's action, praxis. There is no final point at which 
development ends. As long as man's consciousness and action 
go on toward an unknown future, the dialectic will continue. 
In challenging the idealistic view of reason, Sartre criti­
cizes Hegel for ignoring the role of matter within human 
consciousness. Hegel asserts that matter is the necessary 
condition of man's consciousness which is a humanized form 
12 
of the Spirit. But for Sartre the investigation of the 
dialectic is possible only by comprehending the interaction 
between man's action and external things, so that Hegel 
fails to see matter as outside of mind. Sartre further 
rejects the materialistic tendency to reduce everything, 
including man's consciousness, to matter. For matter, by 
itself, does not generate dialectical reasoning. If matter 
alone evolves dialectically, Sartre insists, only analytical 
reason--not dialectical reason--can explain all interrelation­
ships causally. 
The dialectic is the form of interaction between men, 
man and matter, individual men and groups, and between 
groups within a set of social relationships. Sartre 
criticizes the analytical method of understanding a relation­
ships. Sartre criticizes the analytical method of under­
standing a relationship, such as that used in natural 
science, and compares it with the dialectical comprehension 
of such relationships. In analytical reasoning there is 
the presupposition that every relationship lies in "a 
definite system of a priori principles and laws. " ( CRD 19) 
This he refutes by contending that every movement or 
phenomena is understood only by human experience in dialec­
tical relationship with matter. "It is action asserting 
itself within the undertaking, in the explanation of the 
field and the unification of the means by the end. " ( CRD 20) 
In his article, "Materialism and Revolution. " Sartre 
compares these two ways of thinking and stresses the 
necessity of dialectical reasoning in comprehending the 
world and human history. 
Sartre believes that materialism, as conceived by 
contemporary Marxists, served to reduce the action of mind 
to that of matter. But for the dialectical materialist 
13 
human subjectivity, as action of the mind, is found in 
every worldly interaction. Sartre challenges the material­
ist's view that only material things are rational. This 
perspective rejects as unreal all that is not visible or 
empirically discernible. In rejecting this view Sartre 
refers to Hegel. 
Hegel, on the other hand, states that every rational 
thing is so by human reason. The comprehension of the 
whole is not causal, but is "synthetic and multidimensional. "
10 
The determination that something is rational or real is 
made by man's mind. Every form of matter is the result 
of man's previous attempts to understand or to be conscious 
of it. A rational system cannot be separated from man's 
dialectical relationship to it. This dialectical reason 
is the way man can see and understand what is true. 
Sartre explains this with examples. When one sees a 
desk, for instance, that desk is not a thing with four legs, 
three drawers and so on, but is the result of the particular 
arrangement of its parts. The parts are "isolated appear­
ances. lJIJhen they occur together, it is always within the 
10
sartre, r/1arxism and Revolution, p. 91. 
14 
high unity of a whole, and they are bound together by 
inner relationships, that is, the presence of one modifies 
the other in its inner nature. "
11 In analytical reasoning 
things are understood causally, a unit is only what it 
appears to be. It possesses quantitative characteristics 
within a scientific universe. In perceiving an object a 
materialist using analytical reason notes different elements 
which unite to form one object. For example, the chemical 
making of water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen. 
Yet, even in combination, "the elements' retain their 
individual identity. "
12 
But for Sartre, using Hegelian 
dialectical interpretation, water is the totality which 
results from the set of elements and their combination. 
It is irreducible into its original state of independent 
oxygen and hydrogen. The objective of science is to analyze 
the various elements which are combined to form an object 
and to thereby learn more about the object. It cannot prove 
the qualitative transformation of the object. Only dialec­
tical reasoning can comprehend the quality and the internal 
unity of things. Though a dialectician, Sartre condemns 
the idea of a dialectic of nature. To him, nature cannot 
develop its relationship to man by itself. 11 a tter is 
animated only from without. For there to be a dialectic 
its subject must not only be part of the dialectical 
movement but also the agent of comprehension of that 
12
Ibid. , p. 92. 
dialectic. If there is a dialectic in nature, it must 
be that nature is able to participate in the dialectical 
movement and conceive the movement by itself. This is 
15 
what Sartre disagrees with. Even though there is dialectical 
movement in nature, only human consciousness can see and 
know that its totality (matter or nature) is the synthesis 
from the past and the beginning of another synthesis. 
Dialectical thinking is intelligible through totalization. 
A totality is not a process, but merely the result of 
past activity which is an internally related whole. Total-
ization, however, is action in process though it is also 
internally related. Totalization is the action of human 
consciousness to transform the external world into the 
internal world, to posit the external into one's project. 
It is action which occurs anywhere and at any time, both 
individually and universally. Norman McLeod defines 
totalization in "Existential Freedom in the Marxism of J. 
P. Sartre" as "a method of integrating existentially 
free human activity into dialectical pattern. "
1.3 
To understand human action and history in terms of 
totalization and to understand totalization in its various 
forms one must first understand the concept of te��oraliza-
tion as discussed in Being and Nothingness. For the temporal 
totalities of human activity constitute the action of 
1.3Norman McLeod, "Existential Freedom in the Marxism 
of Jean-Paul Sartre", Dialogue, 7, 1968-69, p • .3.3· 
16 
endless movement toward new object. Sartre states that for 
an action, "to totalise itself means to temporalise itself. " 
(CRD 5 3) The three aspects of time, past, present, and 
future, are "like a point without dimension. "1
4 
The past 
is the past in the present. The past exists and remains 
as a transcendent past and, at the same time, a predictable 
future. The present , thus, should be known as the synthesis 
of the past and the future. These aspects of time are not 
sequential. Time exists in man' s consciousness as the 
internal relationship between past , present and future. 
Thus , temporalization is the dialectical activity of human 
consciousness, and existence is itself constant temporal-
ization. Temporalization is "a constant self-transcendence 
from what I am no-longer to what I am not-yet, which makes 
time itself a structure of my being. "15 In Search for a 
r.1ethod Sartre makes it plain that "dialectic as a movement 
of reality collapses if time is not dialectic. " ( sp;vr 92) 
Time is not given to man but , conversely , man defines time 
through temporalization. "One must understand that neither 
men nor their activities are in time, but that time, as 
14Jean-Paul �artre, Heing and Nothingness, trans. 
Hazel E. Barnes, I\iew York , L'iashington Square P ress , 1966 
p. 159. Hereafter this book is referred to as BI'·I and 
future page references will appear in parentheses in the 
main body of the text. 
15Yirmiahu Yovel , "Existentialism and Historical 
Dialectic , "  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39 , 
197 9 ' p . 482 . 
concrete quality of history, is made by men on the basis 
of their original temporalization." (Ibid. ) 
Sartre insists that the internal connection of 
temporality by human consciousness " has its being outside 
17 
of it, before and behind. Behind, it was its past, and 
before, it will be its future • • • • A t  p resent it is not 
what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future) ." (BN 179) 
Human consciousness is the " flight" toward that which is not 
yet. T emporalization is the expression of the action of 
totalization in accordance with the nature of time. T otality 
is temporal in the sense that it is endlessly absorbed 
within a still newer totality. T he endless movement 
searching for an unknown future is itself totalization. 
For Sartre the temporal totality is merely a moment of 
practical totalization. 
Human acts of totalization never end, and are reciprocal 
with one another. Men totalize their environment in 
accordance with their desires for existence. Their various 
totalizations meet one another in daily life. One encounters 
another person or another person's activity as an object or 
circumstance of one's own. Both parties intermingle as 
parts or objects of each other's totalizing activity. In 
human consciousness of the future the totality is not an 
eternal entity , but is always the starting point of 
totalization in process. :::1an produces an object , for 
example , which is then used to totalize the environment of 
another. Both parties encounter one another through 
totalized obj ects. T heir action is mediated by the obj ect 
and a reciprocal relationship is formed. In life man 
seeks the final achievement of some desirable state. 
However, there are only momentary or partial totalities 
18 
which are inevitably detotalized and formed yet again. One 
is merely part of the totalization of others or a still 
smaller element within the larger totality that is human 
history. T his is a never-ending, ongoing process . 
Man exists within the system of history onl y through 
his acts of totalization. T his characteristic of human 
existence shows that men are interrelated , regardless of 
the diachronical sense of physical existence. O ne's 
culture begins its evolution long before one is born. �an 
finds himself only through his relationship with this 
environment which has been totalizing for generations. 
One who lives in the present can experience this past 
though prior to his existence, through the culture surround­
ing him. T hrough the cultural experience one in the 
present is connected internally with ancient people. This 
relations hip through one's culture is due to the totaliza-
tion of encompass ing conditions by one's predecessors . 
• • • this culture which I call mine must be conceived 
as specific participation in interiority in the 
_ objective culture • • • • A s  s oon as I reflexively 
grasp this bond of interiority which links me 
to the cultural totalisation , I disappear as a 
cultivated individual and emerge as the synthetic 
bond between everyone and what might be called 
the cultural field • • • . In this wav I find mvself 
dialectically conditioned by the totallsed and � 
totalising past of the process of human development: 
• • • • I totalise mys elf on the basis  of centries 
of history and, in accordance with my culture, 
I totalise this experience. (CRD 5 4) 
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Sartre regards an individual as his temporalizing 
activity and refers to this way of understanding as the 
progress ive-regressive method. To see a totality is to 
comprehend its past and future simultaneously. To see man 
as he is is to see him as he was regressively and as he 
will be progressively. One of Sartre's criticisms of 
analytical reasoning is that man and his action is treated 
as a totality with a causal relationship. Through dialecti-
cal development man and his action evolve into new entities 
in future moments. If we observe a person opening a window, 
we assume regressively that at a previous moment he felt 
the need for fresh air and progressively that soon he will 
feel better upon meeting his need. His act of opening the 
window was not merely as it appeared. It also contained 
a past project to meet a need as well as an expected result. 
For Sartre this method of reasoning is not mere contemplation, 
but calls for comprehension through dialectical reasoning. 
History is the sum of individual totalizations. 
This totality is not static but is evolving endlessly 
toward the unknown future. Thus , history as a dialectic 
never ends in the sense that man's striving for completion , 
for totalization is never attained. Every moment in the 
process meets the negation of the present state. 
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Nevertheless this striving , this projective character­
istic of man's thinking, is a crucial element in the 
comprehension of man. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF PRAXIS 
An individual man is the subject of investigation of 
human history. Sartre's task in the Critiq ue is to 
develop a social theory without losing this human subjectiv­
ity. "Without living man , " declares Sartre , "there is no 
history. The object of Existentialism--due to the default 
of Marxism- -is the particular man in the social field , in 
his class ,  in an environment of collective objects and of 
other particular men." (SFM 133) Sartre explains what 
existentialism truly is in his "Existentialism is a Humanism" 
and in Being and Nothingness. 
One of the principles of existentialism , especially of 
what Sartre calls atheistic existentialism , is that human 
existence precedes one's essences. This is contrary to 
material objects whose properties (essence) precedes their 
existence. For instance when one wishes to create a desk 
one must first have knowledge of its possible use. This 
is an element of its essence. The process of production 
and the properties of the desk , the wood and steel , determine 
the essence of the desk before its appearence as the 
completed object , the desk. Man conversely , exists prior 
to all of his actions or his character. ::ran has essence 
only by himself, only through his consciousness of a 
totality. The consciousness of being and of endless 
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advancement toward being is the essence of man. This 
permanent flight toward totalization is never completed 
but is simply the ongoing process an individual chooses 
to make. 
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The principle of existentialism is itself that of 
human subjectivity. Man makes himself; there is no other 
power to create him, no God , no nature. This subjectivity 
is itself man's choice of his l ife and his environment. 
As stated in Being and Nothingness, human subjectivity 
which is free choice cannot be transcended. Thus , man is 
condemned to be free. This freedom is not freedom to 
act however one wishes , but the subjective role in one's 
own life and in the whole world. This subjectivity is 
through and in human consciousness. 
For human consciousness to function there must be an 
object of consciousness. Consciousness itself is "empty. " 
It is only transcendent activity toward some object. 
Although Sartre is a disciple of Husserl ' s  phenomenol ogy, 
he doubts that man perceives an object, then the object is 
regarded as it exists. He insists that the existence of 
something is prior to man' s perception of it. In Sartre's 
terms, "consciousness is always consciousness of something 
which is not consciousness itself. '' (BN 9) The consciousness 
implies that there is something (being) before recognition. 
To be conscious of something is through thinking of 
what it is not. If one sees a pen he knows it is a pen 
because he knows everything else which is not th e pen. 
The pen is known by eliminating all other objects. For 
Sartre the activity of consciousness is negation. 
Man's reality is his consciousness. It is the 
consciousness of something (being) but it itself is 
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nothing. His consciousness has no inherent existence. It 
has no definite form but is free. Indeed, consciousness is 
freedom. 
A ccording to Sartre freedom is manifested by anguish. 
This anguish is due to man's responsibility for himself 
and for all mankind. Because existence precedes essence, 
man has responsibility for choosing what he is and what 
he makes of himself. This choice includes all other men 
in the individual's environment. In this sense the 
individual's responsibility extends to all mankind. 
For every man, everything happens as if all 
mankind had its eyes fixed on him and were guiding 
itself by what he does. A nd every man ought to 
say to himself, "Am I really the kind of man who 
has the right to act in such a way1�hat humanity might guide itself by my action?" 
Given this responsibility, man can realize, if he so 
chooses, what he must do or what he must not do at aly 
moment of his life. Sartre asserts that the anguish man 
experiences is the result of this responsibility, of man's 
freedom. Conversely he argues that if man does not 
experience anguish, it is simply because he has surrendered 
16sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism, " p. 7 6. 
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his freedom and therefore lacks responsibility. The man 
who escapes anguish is not free. This anzious development 
of consciousness never reaches a finality. He is never 
considered " as an end because he is always in the making. " l 7  
Temporality is an essential element of human nature. 
Therefore,  essence is not provable in its present form 
for it is an incomplete entity also reaching but never 
gaining the future. If one returns to observation of the 
desk one perceives it not merely in its present, static 
form but as a combination of many elements. One perceives 
its totalized properties , the human project which made it, 
and its future use for man. This comprehension of the 
future and the past emanates from the negation of the 
present condition. This is the basis of human action as 
characterized by projectivity. 
Human consciousness has no rigid structure, it is so 
lacking in form that Sartre insists that it is Nothingness 
(No thing) . This is because consciousness is freedom 
itself, it is total possibility. It has no limitation. 
As man is his consciousness , he should not be defined only 
as he sees himself through a mirror. He is more that 
what is seen in the mirror yet he is never complete, 
always less than totalized. Human consciousness is a 
movement which never reaches its goal. This creature 
17Ibid. , p. 8J. 
which never ends and is never defined, is man. His 
reality is Being-free.(BN 60) 
This freedom is the freedom to choose. Nlan chooses 
what he is or what he will be and what he needs from the 
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outside world in order to exist. "To be a consciousness • • .  
is to make choices at every moment while we are conscious."18 
Human activity within one's relationship with his 
environment , including other people and material objects, 
is in accordance with his chosen project. This means that 
human action is not accidental , but is projective , "a 
conscious project. " (BN 5 5 9) To project is to negate 
the present and to go toward that which it is not yet. 
The project, however, is not the cause of an act , but is 
itself the development of reasoning and the act of transcend-
ence of the present. A project is "conscious and goal­
oriented • • • •  Motivation for action does not come from an 
actual state of affairs but from some possible state of 
affairs in the future."19 This sense of consciousness ,  
freedom, and project as the intention to act moves from 
one's individual ontology to social theory. Sartre, in 
his later works,  introduces the concept of praxis to explain 
these three elements of social relationships. 
18R ichard J. Bernstein , Praxis and Action , Philadelphia, 
The U niversity of Pennsylvania Press , 1971, p. 140. 
19G ila J. Hayim , The Existential Sociology of Jean­
Paul Sartre , Amherst , The University of :11assachusetts Press, 
1980 ,  P• 48. 
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For Hegel, reason (spirit) externally directs 
cons ciousness to self-consciousness. When one encounters 
such absolute reas on, the history of human action ends. 
Sartre, in rejecting this concept of external motivation by 
absolute reason, accepts Marx's concept of praxis as human 
labor. This praxis is an intentional act which has a goal. 
"P raxis-- is any meaningful or purpos eful human activity, 
any act which is not mere random, undirected motion." 
(SFM xvi) It is intended to s urpass the present state. 
"P raxis, indeed, is a passage from objective to objective 
through internalization." (SFM 97) This internalization, 
of course, occurs when one chooses s omething outside of 
hims elf to be an object of his praxis. As McLeod explains, 
"praxis • • • is almos t  a s ynonym for existential freedom: it 
is the freely chosen human project, an end- directed action, 
in a s pecifically social context. "20 It is an expression 
of the practical mode of action in the social and historical 
context. It is the totalization, by which man defines 
himself. 
20 .. L d l·JC eo , p. JJ. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DIALECTICAL TOTALIZATION WITH MATTER AND OTHE R MEN 
According to Sartr e  in  Being and Nothingness, without 
the consciousness of man the world has no meaning. He 
attempts in his Critique, to explain the necessity of 
matter as "in-itself, " as this concept is  explained in  
Being and Nothingness. He asserts that matter, as man's 
external condition of totalization, has a different 
meaning than the materialists give it. Matter is not only 
an inert object, but the mediati on of man's dialectic. It 
exists for man's praxis. In the Critique Sartre makes 
clear that man makes history only in  the context of his 
environmental conditions. This man is  a social being 
threatened by scarcity. The effort to overcome scarcity 
is itself man's totalization. 
The praxis of man i s  intelligible only by interaction 
with his environment, the interiorizes it  and simultaneously 
exteriorizes himself. The interaction occurs when man 
internalizes inert matter into the human world by using it 
as the instrument of his praxis. Wi thout matter man 
cannot be an agent of his own praxis. Just as there is  no 
dialectic of nature without human praxis, there i s  no 
dialectic of human praxis without matter. Matter and 
man's consciousness play equal roles in  the di alecti c. 
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Sartre states that : "man is 'mediated' by things to the 
same extent as things are 'mediated' by man. • • • This is 
what is called dialectical circularity and, • • • , it must 
be established by dialectical investigation." (CRD 79) 
N eed is the beginning of the dialectic. To meet his 
needs man accepts the necessity of working within matter. 
He sets his project towards acquiring his needs. This 
desire to gain what he desires forces him to work through 
his praxis. 
Everything is to explained through need • • • ; 
need is  the first totalising relation between 
the material being, man, and the materi al ensemble 
of which he is part. This relation is  univocal, 
and of interiority. Indeed, it is through need 
that the first negation of the negation and the 
first totalisation appear in matter. (CRD 80) 
Matter cannot relate to man through its own action. Only 
in and through man' s praxis does it become intelligible. 
Labor is the means by which man attains his ends, the 
production of that which he lacks. Yet the fruits of his 
labor cannot be disti nguished apart from him since the 
product is the result of man's project actualized through 
labor. One becomes the product of one's labor. The 
product is itself the producer's externalized praxis. 
It is in  this manner that man externalizes himself. Di ck 
Howard, i n  "Existentialism and '!v1arxism, " explai ns that 
"man externalizes his internal relati on to the external 
world, and in  so doi ng negates its externality; man becomes 
a being-in-the- world and the world becomes a being-for-
man. "
21 This statement expresses how much "things can 
mediate human beings. It also indicates that when human 
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beings become like things it is because of their own action. "
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Man cannot lives solely with the products of his own 
labor. As his life becomes more complicated, and his labor 
divided, he shares his benefits with others. He desires 
their products just as they desire his. For Sartre, if 
these needs were met then interaction would cease. However, 
because the perception of needs always exceeds the availa­
bility of products scarcity is always present. There is not 
enough of everything. This is the starting point of social 
relations, of human beings and of history. 
Men meet each other in the material field they have 
produced. Without the mediation of material things men 
do not have any interrelationship. They recognize others 
by the mediation of their labor. In other words, "matter 
becomes the condition of mediation which creates the possi­
bility of social relation. "
23 The dialectical relationship 
between man and matter and men's need for matter is the 
starting point of the dialectic of human struggle. 
21nick Howard, "Existentialism and Marxism" in Towards 
a New Marxism, ed. Bart Grahl and Paul Piccone, St. Louis, 
Mos. , Telos Press, 1973, p. 109. 
22
Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 52. 
2J Howard, p. 109. 
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D espite his stress on scarcity as the basis of man's 
interaction with his environment, Sartre concedes that 
this is only one possibility of human history. (CRD 125-27) 
The influence of scarcity is limited to the contemporary 
material social structure. 
We have no way of telling whether, for different 
organisms on other planets--or for our descendants, 
if technical and social changes shatter the 
framework of scarcity- -a different History, 
constituted on another basis, and with different 
motive forces and different internal projects, 
might be logically conceivable." (CRD 125 ) 
Sartre says of our history "that it is born and developed 
within the permanent framework of a field of tension 
produced by scarcity." (Ibid.) Within this conflict man is 
the enemy of everyone who threatens his possessions. This 
is the point at which social struggle begins. Scarcity 
(lack) of what men need causes conflicts among men in a 
society to gain the scarce matter. The conflicts lead to 
the hostile recognition of one another and result in 
negation of one another within each member's project toward 
external world. Sartre contends then that, "scarcity is 
24 the negation of man through the presence of other men." 
Practice-inert 
Sartre proposes a further illustration of the material 
conditions relating to man. He conceptualizes the material 
24vJilfrid Desan, Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, Garden 
City, N.Y. Double day & Company, Inc., 1965 ,  p. 96. 
field not only as matter but also as the result of human 
activity. 
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Man totalizes matter into his project toward the 
outside world. "Every praxis is primarily an instrumen­
talisation of material reality. It envelops the inanimate 
thing in a totalising project which gives it a pseudo­
organic unity. " (CRD 161) Human praxis makes matter the 
means of the actor's life and thereby gives inert being 
an organic character. 
By using the concept of "practice-inert" Sartre shows 
clearly the historical relationship between human praxis 
and the resultant matter. Human praxis upon matter also 
affects man. Matter and material environment are the 
result of man's initial praxis operated upon them; "matter 
is inert; it is not an invention of the mind, but a 
petrification of action." (CR D 171) Man also struggles 
against his own praxis. For example, in the past Chinese 
farmers made a human decision to d�forest the land to 
increase cultivation. A unexpected result of the 
d�forestation, however, was increased floods. This is the 
circular character of the dialectic of man within material 
conditions. Once human labor meets matter and instrumen-
talizes it, he cannot control its result. 
Men in society face this process within socioeconomic 
and political contraints. 25 Human activity is restricted, 
25 Yovel, p. 486. 
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limited by the practice-inert from the material environment. 
Future activity is determined by the practice-inert 
created from past praxis. Here, the restriction is not 
only caused by one's action but that of others as well. 
The practice-inert is "the milieu in which actions meet." 
(CRD 376) It comprises not only the material field in 
which man lives but all of his more abstract social 
contracts as well. The invention of the automobile, for 
instance, is intended as a convenience in daily life. The 
use of the automobile, however, results in fatal accidents 
and pollution, things which are not desirable. These 
results, both good and bad, come not only from one person's 
will and praxis but from the desire of many people. 
The result is not only one person's will but also 
others who want the benefit of the automobiles. Through 
the practice-inert, the creation and use of the automobile, 
an individual's praxis is intermingled with that of others. 
The practice-inert is the expression of the materiality of 
human beings in social relationships within the context of 
scarcity. Man is limited by the praxis of others within 
the material field. He is the product of his product. 
Even though the materialized status of man is made 
by man originally, he cannot control the subsequent 
result. ;.:an's initial role in the world is hidden within 
the material field. Sartre maintains that only man's 
initive makes these processes possible. The transformation 
of human praxis into the practice- inert is an inevitable 
development within society. 
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Matter produced by man gradually determines his future 
action. He faces unavoidable restrictions on his actions 
within the material structure of society. Man himself is 
objectified by his need for material goods. It occurs 
when his individual life interacts with the life of others. 
The practice- inert is made only through the praxis of those 
who commonly seek to reduce scarcity. Thus, the practice­
inert is the result of collective praxis. Competition for 
scarce goods is the necessary condition for dialectical 
t . h. t 
26 movemen 1n 1s ory. 
'The practice- inert is a counter against finality. 
(CRD 193) This means that totalized things do not stay 
at their final point of the process of totalization; they 
change the totalized state into the practice- inert, which 
is a threat to the original praxis. For example, the 
industrialization of society affects the life of the rural 
classes. Through mechanization landowners can produce 
more with less labor. Mechanization results in the 
unemployment of some workers and the reduction of wages 
for those competing for fewer jobs. Thus, the use of 
machinery is a counter- finality for rural workers. This 
counter- finality to the rural workers is not as disasterous 
26.Marjorie Grene, Sartre, New York, New Viewpoints, 
197 3' p. 102. 
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to landowners, for the interests of the two classes differ. 
The practice- inert is a bridge between human conscious­
ness and the reality of matter.27 The practice- inert is, 
for Sartre, the way that man departs from isolated indi­
viduality and completes himself as a collective historical 
being, for the dehumanization produced by society's 
practice- inert stimulates men to protect themselves 
collectively. 
Serial Collectivity 
Sartre rejects the Marxist definition of matter, 
preferring to define it as the transformation of human 
activity. He thinks that the practice- inert negates human 
dignity, generating what he calls "anti- praxis." The 
practice- inert is a moment in the transition of the 
dialectic from the individual to the collective. The 
practice- inert "becomes, by and for men, the fundamental 
motive force of History." (CRD 183) 
The practice-inert results in alienation. �·:an, for 
example, sets his praxis in gold, endowing it with value. 
Transporting, loading, unloading, and protecting gold gives 
it more value. Man himself becomes gold insofar as his 
labor earns it. The consequences of this are seen in 
industrial society: though man creates and operates 
machines, mechanized mass production makes him a slave to 
27
odajnyk, pp. 163-64. 
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material abundance. He becomes an object which is defined 
by the product of his own labor. In this state he is 
merely an object, other than himself. 
Sartre attempts to explain man's position within the 
practice-inert field through a third observer. Before man 
recognizes others as having the same project as he does, 
he is thoroughly isolated. Men are, in Sartre's term, in 
"seriality. " They have no relationship but indifference. 
Men in this state are defined as inert, nothing but inorganic 
objects. Sartre cites an example of a group of people in 
a bus station. They form a line for a "common aim": a bus. 
Their commonality lies in living in the same district, 
working in the same factory, or operating the same kind of 
business. Man in seriality exists in a mode of negation 
of others. Even though people in line do not realize their 
mutual negation, they are made interdependent through the 
practice-inert, the bus they are awaiting. They do not 
care who the other man is, what he does, or where he lives. 
They are only whole as "a plurality of isolations. " (CRD 256) 
They are different from each other in thinking and in 
doing. They negate their mutual dependence by not realizing 
it. They do not realize it is possible to depend on one 
another in the practice-inert field. They are in a unity 
through the bus. 
There may be an inadequate number of seats for all 
of those in line, in which case everyone is the competitor 
for a seat. "As an ordering, it becomes a negative 
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principle of unity and of determining everyone's fate as 
Other by every Other as Other. " ( CRD 261 ) Everybody is 
defined by the order which he has in line to get in the 
bus. If I were ninth in line perhaps I could take a seat, 
but if I were tenth I could not. I am tenth, and therefor e 
without a seat, because of the other nine people before 
me in a line. 
I see the man as the Other, and, conversely, he sees 
me as a mere object of his praxis. This Otherness is 
hostility in the context of scarcity. More important, I 
realize that I am the Other too, and this recognition makes 
me feel alienated, outside of humanity. 
At the same time there may be some identification 
among the people in line. This limited identification is 
based on the awareness that others are also in line, and 
that the bus is needed by them as well. Yet this identifi-
cation is only recognization of the existence of the other. 
There is no inter action beyond a superficial level. "They 
reciprocally deny any link between each of their inner 
worlds. "28 People in line for a movie, or in a market, or 
those who are listenting to the same message on the radio 
are all members of inert collectives which are gathered, 
without common action, towards a common goal. 
28R.D. Laing and D . G. Cooper, Reason and Violence, 
Rev. ed. , London, Tavistock, 1971, p. 122. 
They are all Othe rs through the mediation of things. 
Away from the inte riority of the individual, man stands 
as an ine rt existe nce, an othe r among Othe rs. Se riality 
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is characterized by the Othe rne ss: feel ing isolated, 
powerless, impotent against the practice-inert. Seriality 
is the mode of everyday life commonly e xperie nced by 
independent individuals. In the conte xt of scarcity and of 
powe rlessness to control it, people in certain colle ctives 
are alienated from their praxis. 
A ll relationships among men are "mediated" by third 
parties.29 For Sartre, man cannot recognize his integration 
into the activity of others by himself. The mediator of 
the environme nt is a third party not re cognized by the two 
actors. For instance, I see a man in line to by a stamp 
at a post office and a woman inside a window selling a 
stamp to the man. The two persons know each othe r just 
as they are in that mome nt. How the two person's activities 
are integrated into each othe r's project toward e ach other ' s  
outside world is seen onl y to a third man who looks at 
the two actors yet is not recognized by them. Each knows 
that the opposite party does not know what he has be en 
doing, or thinking, or what he will do in the future . 
Howe ver, the third man knows that even if the y do not care 
29The mediation of third party is first explained 
in p. 106 in the Critique, and this also appe ars in the 
explanation of individual existence within group action 
late r. 
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about each other, they are al ready in a mutual relationship, 
for they meet in their environmental conditions. This 
does not mean men are all indifferent to each other. They 
may be famil y, friends, or neighbors. But they do not 
recognize each other in the context of each other's project 
toward the outside world and of its mutual integration. 
Their reciprocity is recognized by a totalizer in their 
milieu. Through the total ization of the environment the 
third party sees the two other actors as the object of his 
total ization. This is the mode of men's mutual connection 
and its intelligibility. Everyone exists as both the third 
party and the object of another third's praxis . 
In the dialectical connection between men and their 
environment, matter is the driving force of the human 
dial ectic. Although matter and the material environment are 
instrumental ized by man's praxis, they provide the ground of 
history through man's mediation. Matter as the field of 
the practic e- inert seems to dominate man's praxis, making 
it static and powerl ess. Neverthel ess, Sartre contends 
that man, through new acts of human freedom, can counter 
this inert serial ity. Individual free praxis encounters 
the sol ution of this serial ity by acting togather with 
others. 
CHAP'I ER IV 
'IHE D IALECTICAL LINK BETWEEN INDIVI DUAL AND GR OUP 
In this part of his Critique, Sartre attempts to 
construct his social theory. In Desan's words, " it is the 
constant purpose of Sartre' s book to make intelligible the 
c ollective praxis, as he now attempts to do through tracing 
the slow organization of the worker's collec tive and their 
plan to reconstruct the social field ... 3° 
To be understood in concrete terms, freedom must be 
seen in relation to its environment. In social theory 
man is free insofar as his freedom is harmonized with 
others. In Odajnyk's term , Sartre gives meaning to man's 
freedom in the sense that " his responsibilities and his 
choices are movements shared by the entire structure in 
which he lives." 3l 
W ithin society's economic and political life individual 
interests differ. Through the increase in mechanization 
landowners earn profits while workers are increas ingly 
vulnerable to underemployment or unemployment and poverty 
because machines are replaced to man's labor. The working 
3 0  D esan, p. 127 . 
31odajnyk, p. 111. 
39 
40 
class is a collective whos e members share deprivation. 
Daily life centered around the practico-inert, forces men 
to lie in serial powerlessness. Sartre enters into an 
investigation of society from the perspective of class 
dividion. The oppress ion by the practico-inert aris es from 
the economic or political s ystem. Sartre anatomizes the 
capitalis t s ociety in which there are definite class 
distinctions. The owners , for the most part, do not 
realize the need to change the s ocial structure, while the 
workers want to change the present s ocial sys tem. Contrary 
to the assertion of contemporary Marxists , Sartre does not 
think that only the working clas s is the main force in 
creating history. The force is the conflict and interaction 
between classes. The oppressed want to be liberated from 
oppress ive conditions. This is their need towards the given 
world. This is the overriding need of the oppressed. 
Sartre distinguishes the collective from group. T he 
former is represented by a multitude of pass ive individual 
series, having no conscious nes s of the poss ibility of 
common action even though it chances to gather around the 
same practico-inert object. T he latter, on the other hand, 
though not organized around a common goal, is characterized 
by action des igned to escape its powerless nes s in the 
practico-inert field. The latter's action reveals its elf 
as continuous action and reaction between members. I n  
is olated seriality individuals cannot react to the actions 
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of others s ince they do not recognize being re late d to one 
another .  Everybody is Othe r.  As Other, eve rybody exp eri­
ences alie nation and impotency toward the powe r which make s 
them inert. 
Whe n  feelings of alienation become virtually unbearable, 
an individual reacts against this situation. Then people 
indepe ndently reacting to the s ituation s oon perceive a 
common destiny . There must be an external stimulus to 
force one to find others with a common plight. Pove rty or 
political oppress ion often p rovides this s timu lus . On 
July 12, 1789 citizens of Paris rose against their 
government.  Individual feelings of oppres sion we re share d .  
T he re was an invis ible conne ction between thos e individu al 
expressions of dis content . As the degree of oppression and 
anguis h  is increas ed, people gathe r more cohes ive ly. In 
such a gathering, though people have common fee lings, they 
do not as yet share a common cou rs e of action. This is 
the state of what Sartre calls the "group-in-fusion. " 
Group- in-fus ion 
The necessary condition to be a group is to regard 
common nee d  as individual need.  In their s truggle to 
survive people su ddenly see  in their environme nt that there 
are others who have the same des ire and dete rmi nation to 
act against a give n danger or for a pe rceived need.  As 
s c atte red individuals , as series ,  people in a collective 
re alize their common powerlessness . In a group, however, 
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people regard each individual aim as the common aim. Each 
believes that the common objective is nothing more than his 
own objective. As Sartre says, 
• • •  the group constitutes itself on the basis of 
a need or common danger and defines itself by the 
common objective which determines its common 
praxis. Yet neither common need, nor common praxis, 
nor common objectives can define a community 
unless it makes itself into a community by feeling 
individual need as common need, and by projecting 
itself, in the internal unification of a common 
intergration, towards objectives which it produces 
as common. ( CR D  35 0) 
Each individual chooses his position, or the limit of his 
freedom, in becoming a member of the community. In order 
to protest government abuse, for example, one group of 
people demonstrates in the streets, while another group 
destroys government property. Even though both are acting 
toward the same goal and against a common enemy, they are 
not yet unified in acting. On impulse, one man issues an 
order which many obey. Another man issues a second, 
independent order which others follow. There are many 
groupings and regroupings based on scattered words or 
actions. This is the action of the group in fusion. 
Everybody is a leader and a follower. Each person chooses 
to which order he will submit. He spontaneously limits 
his freedom to join the common action, identifies his aim 
with the common aim, and his project with the common project. 
Sartre calls this "self- determination. " Here, "the stru cture 
of serial otherness is replaced by a fusion of the Same. 32 
32 Howard, p. 114. 
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U nlike those in the serial collective, in which each is 
Other to everyone else, in a fused group everyone recogniz es 
his neighbor as himself. They become brothers facing a 
common external threat. 
The mutual interaction between group member is recog­
nized by a mediator. The third man who mediates between 
the interaction of two parties is a member of a group in 
fusion. There may be as many thirds as there are people in 
the crowd in fusion. The voice directing other men's 
actions is a totalizer. By shouting "go to the Bastille" 
a man becomes a leader of the movement toward the Bastille. 
For in a group in fusion anyone may be the mediator or the 
mediated. There is no particular leader. A nyone may order 
the group to act in a certain way and in so doing totalize 
the common action. All members of a such group in fusion 
are no longer a series but not yet part of an organized 
group. The existence of this group is possible only through 
the mediation by members as thirds who unite other individ­
uals with a common purpose. Futhermore each member is 
recogniz ed as a member through the mediation by the group 
as whole. The latter mediation means that one receives the 
status of a member once it is recognized that he shares 
the common aim of the group. 
P ledged Group 
After achieving a common goal, individuals in the 
group in fusion lose the need to remain united with other 
men. Insofar as the group in fusion is characterized 
by the individual' s  free limitation of his freedom to 
gain another greater freedom, the group then dissolves 
itself into another serial collective. 
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When people gather to achieve a common goal, the group 
is the means of composition of common action. The group 
action arising from the anxiety of powerlessness is dissolved 
either when the goal of the action is achieved successfully 
or when the enemy against which the group acts is not 
affected by that action. O ne example of such group action 
is the conquest of the Bastille by citizens of Paris. After 
they had conquered they were faced with a crucial choice of 
either returning to their serialized lives or letting the 
government suppress them again. They did not want either. 
The people in the group sought to attain the group cohesion, 
released from seriality and protected from further oppression. 
In spite of this desire of men for unity another 
danger from within arises. The group in fusion is defined 
as a multiplicity of individual praxis. This multiplicity 
is endangered when threatened by disintegration from within. 
The internal need to maintain a bond may manifest itself as 
a spontaneous action, a compulsion. It is deemed necessary 
that individuals swear loyalty to the permanent structure 
of the group. To retain membership in the group one is 
continuously asked to limit individual freedom in deference 
to the common goal. 
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Despite the fact that each member of the "pledged group " 
acts according to the direction of the group itself, Sartre 
nevertheless claims that the action of the pledge is 
necessary and is the free choice by the individual to protect 
himself from danger. Through the action of a pledge the man 
as a mediating third is locked into the inertia of pledge. 
By swearing fidelity the individual is released from 
the fear of being alone. A t  this stage there are but two 
choices: the limitation of the pledge or alienation. A s  
"a free limit of freedom" in Sartre ' s words, everybody as 
a third p arty swears his loyalty. The third party as a 
mediator becomes the regulator watching for betrayal 
from within the group. By making a pledge to protect all 
members from external enemies all members are equal, so 
that one is gu aranteed freedom from betrayal as one guaran­
tees the same freedom to others. My pledge guarantees 
other third ' s  pledge. The pledge is made by a third to 
every other third party. "It is at this level of integra­
tion that the social group is born . .. JJ For Sartre, 
however, this is still by a free human choice that each 
individual is restricted by group membership. I n  the 
objectification of a written pact the members are released 
eternally from returning to the former state (seriality) 
"it is the eternal, frozen preservation of its rising. " 
(CR D 4J6) The necessity of a pledge shows that there is 
JJHayim, p .  94 . 
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always the possibility of betrayal . The group in fus i on is  
composed of individual actions and is a spontaneous limita­
tion of individual freedom . In the pledged group , however , 
the individual is the means of group power itself . There 
is only the group praxis that the individual must follow .  
A t  this l evel the group i s  the end itself , the symbol of 
cohes ion. This group does not call for voluntary alignment , 
but force s  members to stay . This is expressed by the fear 
of terror . 
Through terrorism , permanent membership is guaranteed . 
T error is exercised either through physical force or s imply 
by the elimination of one ' s  name from the membership , 
meaning a return to al ienation and powerlessness . 
I t  is s till true that my pledge is a guarantee 
for the other third party a but the meaning of this 
guarante e  is  precisely violence . The third party 
is guaranteed against my fre e  betrayal by the 
right which I have granted everyone ( including 
him ) to eliminate me in the event of my failure , 
and by the Terror which the common right establ ishes 
within me and which I have demanded ;  and this 
guarantee- -wh ich deprives h im of any excuse in 
the event of dispersal of betrayal- -means that 
he can fre ely guarantee his own s ol idarity ( freely 
demand T error for himself ) . ( CRD 4JJ )  
The terror i s  called the " fraternity- terror . "  
R egulation is necessary to bind pledged members as bro thers 
and s isters . If there is a traitor , the rest of the 
membership may become lynchers . The violence by the 
lynchers is " Terror agains t the traitor"  and " a  practical 
bond of love between the lynchers . "  ( C RD 4)9 ) Freedom 
still exists among the members because violence to maintain 
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group s ecurity is a free relationship among members. 
Fraternity- terror is itself a protection of the members 
against s eriality. In a word, the intelligibility of the 
group comes about from the character of violence for the 
common freedom. The common freedom "as a common s tructure 
is the permanent violence of individual freedom of aliena­
tion. " ( CRD 441 ) 
T he result of the collective action was a totality 
by group praxis. There could then occur an anti- finality, 
a return to the state of s uppression by the existing 
oppressing power. S ince the fus ed group has no further 
reason for group activity, the fear of the counter-finality 
leads the members to the cohesive status . T he pledged 
group is s till in fus ion. This the beginning of the process 
of institutionalization. 
Organization 
T he process of development from the fused group to a 
more mechanized group is called organization. The group is 
not a totality, but the organized activity of its members. 
S artre defines organization as "a distribution of tasks. 
And it is the common objective (common interest, common 
danger, common need assigning a common aim) which defines 
praxis negatively and lies at the origin of this differenti­
ation. " ( CRD 446 ) Group members are divided by either 
their pro�essional skill or their assigned functions, 
depending on the group ' s  aim. The member is the function 
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h e  performs and the function is the means of linkage between 
members . The function as the distribution of tasks "remains 
an inert limit of the freedom of the third party , and , 
therefore , its basis is still T error . " (CR D 449) Terror 
reappears whenever the links between various functions seems 
to have broken down . The organization is  itself an act of 
the group toward a more c oncrete stage of collective action. 
One comprehends the O ther by the function he performs . 
Through the mutual r elationship between our tasks in the 
group we are l inked to each other , and , colle c+.ively the 
links constitute group . It is very similar to the system 
of the human body as a functional phys iol ogical uni t .  
Interrelated functions are elements forming an organized 
set.  What we must remember , however , is that social 
functions in groups are not exactly like those of natural 
organisms . For the latter is  self-produced activity , whil e 
the former is produced by other authors . Sartre uses the 
exampl e of a s occer team . On a team , each player has his 
own pos ition . Each member acts not by his own will , but 
according to the function of the pos ition. The duty of 
the goalkeeper is different from that of a forward .  Other 
functions are ass igned by third parties who may be coaches , 
spectators , or other players . The members l imit their 
freedom in the interest of the team effort . The game 
itself i s  total i zed by a player kicking the ball and 
dire cting the next action of a teammate .  In directing the 
ball to another player , one totalizes the activity of the 
player who receives it and the act ivity of the team as a 
whole, with victory as the final goal. In this sense, 
each member at some point determines by his judgement and 
actions the fate of the entire team. Conversely, the 
actions of the player are determined by his role within 
the team. The function of an individual is itself a tool 
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of the group ' s  goal. He is the common individual who is 
characterized by the group spirit . One ' s freedom is 
realized through a united effort directed toward a common 
aim. The sacrifice of one ' s freedom in difference to team 
victory is a prerequisite of participation in the game. 
The totality of each player' s role or action is itself the 
group ' s  unity, "and in serving the common undertaking • • • 
everyone turns out to be serving him. " ( CRD 460 ) This is, 
for Sartre, practical and necessary to accomplish the common 
goal. This spontaneous limitation of one ' s freedom is his 
free choice to stay with the group. 
Sartre claims that the individual in an organization 
merely changes the quality of his freedom from ontological 
state to social. As a social being, free man is absorbed 
more and more into relative freedom with other men. Sartre, 
in speaking of group freedom, asserts that, "the freedom is 
not free activity of an autonomous organism but, from its 
origins, a conquest of alienation • • • • " (CR D 5 5 8) 
5 0  
Common Praxis 
Since there are some things which an individual cannot 
do by himself , a group is formed to do it by collective 
power. By involving himself in a group activity ,  an indi• 
vidual realizes that the common project is the same as his 
own individual projects. The formation of a group is a 
means to achieve the common project as my project. This is 
the condition of common action. 
Sartre proposes a method for the comprehension of group 
action as a single entity. Dialectical investigation is 
the method to understand "the practical relations of 
individual functions within the organised group. " (CRD 5 0 5 )  
The relation is a group . The group praxis "belongs to 
every individual praxis as an interiorized unity of multi-
plicity." (CRD 506) 
As  a group is organized , the common activity reveals 
organized form. Here, the common praxis as the plurality 
of individual praxis is "synthetic temporalisation of the 
organization." (CRD 507 ) A group is seen as a total ity in 
process never to be completed. It is the unity of individual 
praxis as totalizing action. Therefore the totalization of 
the group is comprehended as a unity of individual totali­
zation. Sartre mentions the relationship between individual 
and group praxis in the following manner : 
• • •  common action and individual nraxis exhibit 
a real homogeneity. The individual
-
would be unable 
to understand either his own common action in terms 
of the totalising praxis of group, or that of a 
group external to himself, if the s tructures of 
common praxis were of a different order than those 
of individual praxis .  I f  the objectives of the group 
had a hyper-individual character, then the 
individual would never be able to grasp them. This 
does not mean that the common action is an organic 
s ynthesis of the members of the group but, on the 
contrary, that the group, far from having hyper­
individuality in its action, s ets itself objectives 
of an individualised s tructure and can achieve 
them only through common operations which are 
individual in character. ( CRD 509 ) 
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I n  s um, common praxis is the whole of different totalizing 
actions of individual members. Since the unity, however, 
is toward one and common goal it can be seen as one 
synthetic praxis .  This group action is s een a s  a single 
entity by those in other groups or by individuals who are 
not grouped. When one s ees, for example, a group of 
people playing mus ical i nstruments to perform a symphony, 
he s ees their playing as a s ingle action. They are integr­
ated into each other's play to achieve a common aim--a 
symphony. They appear as one project. Even though the 
player i nteriorizes his and his collegues' goals separa-
tively, to an observer i t  appears as a s ingle action. 
Individual praxis is the model of group praxis that is 
perceived by other groups or non-grouped i ndividuals as a 
single entity. The group is not some supra power controll­
ing the individual. The collective action is formed by 
voluntary individual effort. 
The group's choice of a goal naturally occurs in the 
dialectical process of i ndividual's choice. Participation 
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i n  group action i s  nothing more than individual choi ce,  
that is , one's praxis toward the outs ide world. In group 
activity the individual identi fies other men with hims elf, 
and feels that he is a "common i ndividual, "  a member. 
Thus , to form a group praxis the individual mus t  be 
able to find his end in the common aim . In so doing 
obedience to the common obj ect i s  "nothing more than the 
common acc eptance of the s ame s oluti on, according to which 
a s olution is  mine to the extent that is  the s olution of my 
neighbor. ,, J4 The group is  a product of the organi c praxis 
of each member . 
Like man as an organic b eing , the group has an internal 
link between members and their i nteriori z ation or mediation 
of group interaction. The difference li es in the fact 
that the former constitutes its praxis b y  its own production, 
while the latter is constituted by the former ' s praxis .  
The activity of the former animates the latter , and endows 
it with organi c characteristics. Nevertheless ,  the group 
is  s ti ll i norgani c ,  exis ting only through individuals who 
s erve as third mediators . While individual praxis is  
totali zing activity by a project ,  group praxis is made by 
other organi c authors and the di rection of activity is 
dec ided by the internali z ing activity of indivudual members. 
The latter, therefore,  has no project of its own. Group 
action is  constituted by human praxis ,  and it is not mere 
pass ivity. 
J4 Desan,  p. 17 4. 
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As the reciprocity between two persons is recognized 
only by the mediation of a third party, a group as interre­
lation between its members is recognized only by other 
groups or individuals who are not grouped. In the post 
office, the clerks inside the windows are members of 
the group only in the eyes of customers outside the windows. 
At the same time the clerks view the customers as a group. 
Each group sees the opposite as an objective entity. 
Without an other party perceiving the group as a group one 
does not exist. In the post office, I ,  a customer, see 
the clerk who serves me as a member of a group and mediate 
between the cl erk as a common individual and the service 
of the group as a whole. O nly through my recognization 
that he is a member of a group and that h is service is the 
common aim of the group does the group exist. Each group 
is the object of the totalization of the other. The reci­
procity between groups is the basis of the dialectical 
development of the interaction between different groups. 35 
Instituted Group 
A s  groups evolve ,  they gradually turn to centralized 
authority. In the fused group each individual is the 
regul atory third who can direct collecti ve action; everyone 
is equal . Each member mediates other's integration into 
35Hayim, p. 116. 
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group action. When I totalize individuals, within group 
action, I am totalized by them. This unity in a fused 
group suggests that the group is easily ruptured . As it 
becomes larger and its distribution of functions between 
members becomes more complex , it must be institutionalized. 
Institutions are c haracterized by hiarachical form. Man 
encounters another seriality as a group becomes organized. 
All members are sub j ec ts ,  and , at the same time, obj ects of 
group action. As the group becomes organized , members 
become the means by which organization is achieved . At 
this stage, each member is mediated by others. Seriality 
is deepened. In a more institutionalized group "once those 
who the � again • • •  have become simultaneously and 
secretly Others, alterity becomes the secret truth of unity 
for everyone. " ( CRD 59J ) Sartre asserts that the inert 
unity in the institution is "the struggle of freedom 
against an internal revival of seriality. " ( CRD 598 )  
Because of the repetition of seriality and its inevitability, 
Sartre remarks, "it is beginning to appear that the 
movement of the investigation may possible be circular. " 
(CRD 591 )  
The institution is a new way to regulate the betrayal 
of individuals. But it is also a dialectical necessity. 
Sartre explains the transition from the group in fusion to 
the institution in terms of temporalization. The process 
from serialized group to fused group and back again is 
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circular. It is the endless flight toward the future. In 
S artre • s wordss " the group creates itself in order to 
create and destroys itself by creating itself. " (CRD 5 90 )  
As the scale of the group becomes larger, the conflicts 
between sub-groups become more complicated. Bureaucracy in 
modern society appears as a systematically regulatory 
structure to control the arising sub-groups through its 
divisions of roles and hiarachical centralization. 
I n  a fused group everybody is sovereign. But a 
bureaucracy needs concentration of power for controlling 
traitors. As the power of regulation is concentrated, 
it becomes authority. This authority need not be a 
particular sovereign power. Within group in fusion every 
member regulates everyone else. All are equal as mediators, 
thirds, and as such are co-sovereigns. Everyone also is 
capable of betrayal under unre�trained free fusion as well 
as is regulator. To maintain permanent group cohesiveness 
and to defend against betrayal, it is necessary to centralize 
all regulatory authority. By accepting a single regulator, 
members cede their rights. Authority is granted to one 
sovereign. The sovereign may be one man or one well­
organized group like a political party. If there is one 
leader, he interiorizes the multiplicity of third parties 
in the group. That is, all third regulatory power is 
centralized in him. "He is a universal mediation, and he 
destroys reciprocity wherever it exists, and relations 
between transcended third parties cannot establish themselves 
except through his mediation . " ( CRD 62J)  By obeying his 
order , o ther third parties become the product of his 
s overe ignty . For Sartre , this sovereign authority is not 
a super power , but is a consequence of human action since 
it resulted only from members ' conceding their rights . 
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In a bureaucracy , sub-groups and individuals who are 
not part of a group are directed by the s overeign .  Sub­
groups must function as a mediation between the top 
authority and the serial bottom in the pyramid . In the 
bureaucratized stru cture , however , the s overeign ( top 
leadership ) keeps trying to maintain hiarachies which 
prevent sub-groups and non-grouped individuals from acting 
independently and thereby threatening the sovereign ' s 
monopoly on power . 
Sartre critici zes Stal inism as the model of one-person 
bureau cracy . For Sartre revolution can be succeed only by 
an oppressed class through its spontaneous upris ing . The 
Communist Party once in power constitutes a new dominant 
class with its own bureaucracy , which inevitably turns 
away from carrying out the revolution and instead concen­
trates on cons olidating its own power. 
The disscuss ion up to this point has dealt with the 
intelligibil ity of collective praxis as the solut ion of 
individual isolation. As an individual is involved in more 
institutional i zed group action , the free individual praxis 
of a group member becomes unimportant : his function in a 
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group is what he is . Group praxis appears as external 
determination of individual members ' praxis . There is 
endless effort to be liberated from the serial ity . This 
cycle of endless interaction of s eriali zed individuals and 
groups is  history its elf . 
CHAPTER V 
C ONCEPTUALI ZAT I ON OF HISTORY 
A s  a diale ctic develops from an individual entity into 
a group entity , the individual , stirring to meet his needs 
in the outside world , accepts the interiorization of his 
environment as his pro j ec t .  Facing s carc ity , the individual 
becomes the O ther to men who have the same pro j ect for 
survival . Matter produced by man returns to man as the 
inert resul t of man ' s praxis . R ecipro c ity between men is 
mediated by matter . They recognize each other as an obj ect 
of each individual total i zation. This social relationship 
begins the obj ectification of human praxis . One ' s  praxis 
toward his environment is dissolved as an obj ect by the 
other ' s  praxis .  To counteract the impotency of the individ­
ual , men who have a common aim in a given social situation 
gather to s olve the ir problems collectively . Nonetheless , 
no matter what type of coll e ctive actions are exercised , 
Sartre claims they can have the ir meaning only in and 
through the individual man as the agent of all recipro city .  
The very beginning o f  reciprocity i s  the condition that 
" man is a practical organism l iving with a multipl icity 
of s imilar organisms in a field of s carcity . " ( CRD 7 35 )  
No one in s ocial relationsh ips can avo id confl icts or 
cooperation wi th environmental conditions , including other 
men. 
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Society is like a pot filled with different serialized 
groups and individuals . A society its elf is the collective 
of individuals who stand s ide by side in reciprocity with 
one another . The distinct elements of a social s tructure 
are revealed in the relationship of groups and s eries . 
( CRD 6J5 ) There are endless c yclical movements from the 
group to the s eries and back again. A group is formed to 
achieve a goal. When the goal is achieved, the group 
generally dissolves into s eries, which may once again be 
formed into a group when a new goal is made. In highly 
organized groups, man' s seriality is deepened by the manip­
ulation o f  the s overeign group, the ruling elite. The 
group is dissolved in the attempt by the members to regroup 
as individuals . This may o c cur at any point in s ocial life. 
History is the dialectic in which groups come from a 
s eries, to which they eventually return.  In this state men 
are indifferent to each other. Men in s eries act to negate 
their being, which is made the obj ect of another's proj ect. 
A group is formed when men in a series feel an impotency 
which they attempt to overcome. These movements between 
the s tates of groups and series occur dialectically, as we 
have s een. It is the result of totalizing activities of 
groups and s eries . 
The history of the individual's s ocial life, according 
to Sartre, begins with an isolated individual, existing 
in the practice-inert field. It evolves towards the 
creation of a group in fusion, the appearance of an organized 
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group , and a return to the original state . Within the 
context of history , groups are quasi-actors , as constituted 
praxis derived from individual constitutive praxis . The 
group is the unity of multiple individual pro j e cts . Human 
individuality is comprehended within the group entity . 
Individual total ization is replaced by group total i zation .  
The group is the only way to gain practical freedom in 
s ocial l ife . The group is the means by which man cooperates 
in order to survive . I t  is "� mode of existence : • • • the 
group is both the most effective means of controll ing the 
surrounding material ity in the c ontest of s carcity and the 
absolute end as pure freedom liberating men from alterity . " 
( CRD 67 3 )  
The group has a continuous relationship with serial 
men who are not yet grouped . For instance ,  a xollection o f  
serial individuals who desire t o  gain colle ctive power 
could form the ir own group . This new group opposes the 
existing power . If the new group destroys the old , the 
latter returns to a s eries . Likewise , if the new group is 
suppressed by the old , the former is interiorized by the 
latter-- that is , dissolved into the series . R egardless of 
which result is attained it is not lasting .  Inevitably 
the new group will face other challenges either from within 
or from without which will either be suppressed and absorbed 
or will prevail and thereby begin the pro cess anew by 
opposing other serial individuals . 
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Within the organization , the distribution o f  tasks and 
the fear of fraternity- terror transform c ommon freedom into 
a me chani zed s tructure . Individuals and sub-groups are 
manipulated by the attempt of the institutional i zed 
leadership to permanently rule . This activity becomes 
externally determined and the sub-groups and individuals 
rel inquish the ir own judgement . In this context , man is 
al ienated from his own l oyalty to the group and is sub j e ct 
to the supervision of a more inhuman and mechanized terror . 
From this s eriality a new need for protection arises . 
Between the existing and the resis ting powers one party 
totalizes the other . One recogne zes the other as an ob j ect 
of its praxis . The reciprocity is itself a dialectical 
movement . 
By circularity Sartre means that the states of series 
and group are repeated , not with same content byt only with 
the same form.  The circularity is not the recurrence of 
the same content of action in the same situati on .  S ince 
everything is interconnected dialectically and is evolving 
toward an unknown future , there is no final state . One 
cannot determine which state pre cedes the other between the 
group and the series . They are all on a circl e . There is 
no given priority ; " they are rec ipro cally product and 
producer ,  in continual interaction and modification . .. J6 
J6 Howard , p .  101 . 
• 
The s erial ity is never eliminated . A ccording to 
Sartre ' s  logic , if the group never faces dissolution into 
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the series , history stops there . For the alienated serial ity 
is caused by a perception of s carcity which can never be 
el iminated.  In industrial soc iety class distinctions are 
quite deep , with the population divided between capitalists 
and workers . Such a society can be defined as a c ontainer 
of different classes . There is a reciprocal re cognition 
between classes just as there is between individuals and 
between groups . That is , through the existence of another 
class one class recognizes its own existence and s ees its 
own interests as different from the other . The interaction 
between classes is the dialectical exchange of each clas s ' s  
praxis as a whol e . 
C lass as an interior bond between members is composed 
of institutionali zed groups , fus ed groups ,  and series .  
As a container of each different totalization , a class ,  
unlike the group , does not operate as a s ingle actor . I t  
is rather a whole determined by th e behavior of ea ch a ctor 
who recogni zes that he is a class be ing acting within his 
class interests . The existence of the class reveals itself 
on three different levels . A class is a multiplicity of 
groups and s eries interacting with one another and s eeking 
a common goal . The organi zed group within a class ( for 
example ,  trade unions in the working clas s ) acts in the 
interest of the class to change the existing social 
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stru cture . The trade union is  itself " the working class 
obj e ctified , exteriorised , institutional ised and possibly 
bureaucratised • • • •  " ( CRD 682 ) A s  a fus ed group its 
action seeks to achieve the goals of the class . Among the 
workers c ollectively this level of activity arises at a 
moment of unbearable tens ion . These institutionali zed or 
pledged groups serve as an apparatus for class interests . 
Both of these l evels , the organized and fused group , come 
from the serial ity .  There are also serial individuals who 
are not in fused or institu tional i zed groups , but are 
class-beings acting within the common aim .  The combination 
of the organi zed group s erving as the vanguard or active 
force , with a fus ed group as the locus of c ommon action and 
the s erie s  as the origin or group formation , comprises a 
class .  The dialectical reciprocity between these elements 
of the class creates a practical unity between members . 
Thes e  different l evels exist anywhere , and at any time 
wi thin the same class .  
S ince a class is the total ity of total i zation of the 
three levels in pro cess , an individual in s eries is affected 
by the o ther two levels . C oncomitantly , he affects them , 
either as they interiori ze him or are dissolved into other 
series . The reciprocity which exists in the relationship 
between the three levels is understood only through 
dial ectical comprehens ion. One level total i zes the other 
two through its own praxis .  The exchange of praxis among 
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levels is a dialectical movement , for each l evel can recog­
ni ze itself through recognition of the other two . Each 
level is praxis and , at same time , the obj e ct of praxis . 
In a word , a class is , as a whole , a single praxis holding 
a s ingle pro j e ct which man " produce itself differently at 
different practical l evel . "  ( CRD 690 ) A class is the unity 
of many different temporali zations by many different 
sub j ects . 
The intell igibil ity of class action, for Sartre , is 
accompl ished only by the dial ectical comprehens ion of the 
individual man . As an observer outs ide a class and an agent 
of the reciprocal action within a class or in relationship 
with other classes , the individual man is the only total izer 
of class actions . 
The relationship among classes in a society is the 
exchange of praxis of those classes . A society is a 
container of all levels of recipro city between and among 
individuals , groups and classes . In capital ist society ,  the 
conflict between employers and workers emanates from the 
unequal distribution of benefits and contradictory efforts 
to maintain the pres ent structure or to destroy or change 
it . This class struggle resul ts from the effort by one 
class to overcome the al ienation caused by the adversary ' s  
actions . In this instance , workers are al ienated by the 
exploitation of the bourgeoisie . The rea ction of the 
bourgeoisie against the upris ing of the working class is 
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als o  dial ectical . Generally class struggle is understood 
in the context of the dialectical re ciprocity mediated by 
matter . In this example ,  the reciprocal relationship is 
mediated by capital . One class total izes the other into 
its pro j e ct .  The starting point of reciprocity i s  the 
awareness of the adversary as Other . One seeks to interi-
oriz e  the other ' s  fre edom into one ' s  own . 
In the context of s carcity , history is ultimately the 
totali zation of all struggles between different interests 
in the material field . S truggl e begins when one party 
tries to stifle the other ' s  freedom to further its own 
proj ect , and the latter reacts . Sartre refers to violence 
in broad terms resembl ing what we might consider confl ict • 
. 
Thus , praxis as human freedom is naturally violent within 
the reciprocity mediated by inert matter . In the pres ence 
of s carcity , human praxis is a " struggle "  for life , a fight 
to satisfy one ' s  perceived needs . ( C RD 7 36 )  This violent 
struggle is one of " freedom against fre edom through the 
mediation of inorganic matter . " ( Ibid . ) One ' s  opponent in 
such a struggl e may be any other man who threatens one ' s  
freedom , and thus becomes "anti-men, " or even one ' s  
" Brother in so far as he has the permanent possibility of 
becoming anti-human himself . "  ( CRD 7 36-37 ) Through 
total i z ing activity one ' s  praxis dissolves the other ' s .  
One who wants to be an O ther by es caping from the serial 
state into an organi zed group faces the terror produced by 
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fraternity . O ther members violently deny his right to 
secede . This fraternity- terror is the freedom of the rest 
of the members against the freedom of their brother . 
With out the recognition by an individual that the adversary 
is als o  a free entity , that the preservation of one ' s  own 
freedom entail s  in s ome way the negation of the other 
freedom , reciprocity does not exist.  
Prior to a struggle between two parties there is an 
awarenes s  that one ' s  adversary has the same pro j ect one has . 
This party synthesizes the adversary ' s  action and interior­
i zes it into its own proj ect . R eferring , as an example ,  to 
a chess game , Sartre illustrates the inter- comprehens ion of 
two players . By anticipating his opponent ' s  strategy for 
victory , a player devises an appropriate response to deny 
that goal . The moves of the c ompeting players are called , 
by Sartre , " a  series of negative and predictable reaction . " ·  
( CRD 81 J ) The scarcity of opportunities for victory forces 
one to negate the aim of the other . The judgement to move 
one ' s  pie ce is generated from a regress ive remembrance of 
past actions of the other as well as from a progressive 
prediction of his future movements . The relation between 
two players throughout the game is the exchange of praxis 
in order to synthesize each other ' s  temporal decisions and 
actions . 
Man makes history , and history as a totalizing condition 
limits man ' s  actions . The given social conditions man 
faces after birth have been made prior to his birth by 
previous generations . Man is born within his tory. He is 
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the agent of the dialectical devel opment of his tory through 
the interiorization of the given social conditions as 
history , while his totalization is limited by the social 
conditions which have been created before his interiori-
zation. History as the totality of the pas t ,  present and 
future of man is not only the product of human action but 
als o  the bas is on which man acts and is connected with other 
men in all generations , past,  present and future . 
The subject matte r of the Critique is the reciprocity 
of actors in the dial ectical movement of history and its 
intell igibility .  The comprehension of his tory is poss ible 
only by a diale ctical inves tigation of human involvement 
within history. Sartre ass erts that 
• • • relations between men are always the dialectical 
conse quence of their activity to precisely the 
extent that the y arise as a transcendence of 
domination and institutionalised human rel ations . 
Man e xists for man onl y in given circumstances 
and s ocial conditions , s o  every human relation 
is his torical. (CRD 97-98 ) 
History is the universal te mporalizati on. His tory as a 
whole is the multiplicity of individual total izations by 
individual authors . Thus , any particular author cannot 
be the author of the entire total ization of his tory. 
History is itself projective . Insofar as the particular 
totalization is an endless movement toward the unknown 
future , history is also a endless process toward the 
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future. History, furthermore, is not merely accumulated 
past incidents ,  but rather a regressive- progressive synthesis. 
History begins when the individual person begins to 
recognize his external world in the context of scarcity 
and co-existence with other men. History is the process in 
which men endl essly try to s olve their probl ems of 
alienation. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONC LUSI ON 
Jean-Paul Sartre in his Critique of Dialectical Reaso n  
seeks to develop a theory o f  history based on  humanistic 
values. The aim of this thesis is to describe and evaluate 
that project. 
A s  Sartre says in the Search for a Method ,  in his 
introduction to his Critiq ue ,  his object o f  study is individ­
ual man. He tries to explore the position of the individual 
within a social-historical context because individual 
consciousness and actions are always attached to a given 
society and history. For Sartre the individual evolves his 
ontological freedom into practical, social freedom only 
in relation to other men within his economic and social 
situation. 
Dialectical reasoning is chosen to explain the inclusive 
internal ,  and systematic movement of man's relationship with 
his environment. I n  contrast to Hegel , Sartre asserts 
that it is man , not Spirit , who unfolds the dialectical 
progression. He also objects to Marx's notio n that man is 
merely a part of the whole of material nature. Sartre's 
dialectical materialism states that man,  though his 
interaction with matter, comprehends and creates history. 
Sartre attempts to apply existential ontology to the 
systematic interpretation of man's social behavio r. His 
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main contribution to social theory i s  i n  allocating 
priority to an actor's consci ousness and actions. Sartre 
contends that contemporary empirical methods of social 
inquiry generate only simplistic causal relationships. 
Dialectical reasoning , on the other hand, i s  necessary to 
validly depict human reality . 
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Sartre provides the basis for a humanistic interpreta­
tion of social activity by clarifying what man is in his 
social- historical context. His basic and important 
principle i s  that everything begins with man's free p raxis, 
everything man faces in the external world is faced with a 
free choice. 
His explanation, at times, i s  inadequate. Sartre's 
humanistic dialectical materialism is premised on s everal 
p roblematic assumptions. 
1. The P ractico- inert. Sartre argues that the 
material world i s  a product of man , the results of man's 
past p raxis. However, since the practice- inert i s  beyond 
the control of the p roducers, man seems to be powerless to 
control even his own praxis. Why is it necessary to 
produce what man never i ntends? By animati ng the material 
world as the p roduct of human praxis Sartre tries to escape 
the fact that man apparently lies totally within his 
material envi ronment and is often unable to avoid its 
determining influence. 
2. Scarcity. In the context of scarcity men are 
inevitably in conflict. Sartre assumes that men are so 
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egoistic and so hostile that they are totally al i enated from 
each other and, ultimatel y ,  from themselves. Is there any 
poss ibil ity that the members of a society coul d cooperate 
to s hare scarce things with each other? Jus t  as Marxist 
analysis can be applicable only to certain s ocieties , 
Sartre' s  theory of scarcity is applicable to s ome, but 
not necess aril y all ,  s ocieties which experience scarcity. 
It is apparently valid only in s ocieties of hostil e,  
sel f-centered actors. 
J. Violence. T he reciprocity of individuals is 
expl ained as freedom against freedom. It is formed by the 
effort to destroy an adversary ' s  freedom to gain mine. 
Sartre again assumes that man is self- centered. Foll owing 
the emergence of a group- in-fusion, man is l imited by his 
promise to remain l oyal to group action. T he viol ence used 
to maintain his promise is that of freedom against freedom , 
which is revealed as the fraternity- terror. T here is no 
more freedom of individual will unless he is thoroughly 
is olated from s ociety. I n  this s ituation, man can never 
really be free. The sys tem denies individual freedom in 
order to maintain its existence. 
4 .  Third. Men ' s reciprocity can be objectivel y 
observed onl y by another man a s  a third party, not by 
concerned parties. Only through this third , who s ees the 
other two actors as the objects of his perception, can 
both actors have an objectified role in an his torical 
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context. This is als o  the nature of human relationships 
within a social context. Thus, even though Sartre insis ts 
that man is totally free, he believes that man is unable 
to recognize his role in history unaided. 
In s um, Sartre's shortcoming is that, even in the 
context of s ocial and historical relationships, he persists 
in asserting that everything is decided by man's free 
intentionality . R eal s ocial life, however, shows the 
existence of unavoidable restrictions . Nian is inevitably 
influenced by his existing s ocial context in deciding his 
actions . Though man is, as Sartre says, ontologically free, 
and his freedom may never be thwarted under any circumstance, 
he, nevertheless ,  inevitably encounters external limitations. 
From his birth, man faces established s ocial conditions 
which limit his actions . Is it necessary that man's 
product b ecomes anti-praxis ? If s o, then we are not really 
free, for if man freely chose his environment he would 
likely not choose that which harms him. 
Sartre stresses the necess ity of certain conditions 
for dialectical development, but he tends to excessively 
s implify them. For his dialectic to apply to a s ociety 
its participants must encounter scarcity in the same way, 
and feel hos tility and alienation. But if man must lie in 
thes e conditions to satisfy the dialectic, he is already 
not free. Freedom cannot be explained in terms of compul­
sion or coercion. 
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T he general fallacy of S artre's theory is that he 
simplifies social phenomena and perhaps trivializes the 
immense social influe nce on an individual's behavior. 
I nde e d ,  it could be argued that in modern industrial 
societies ,  man ' s alienation from himself is e ven greater 
because e nvironmental pressu re s  are more intense and 
unavoidab le. C hoosing a life style , an occupation, a grou p  
activity, or any other individual proj e ct is strongly 
e ffected b y  one's social structu re. S artre inadvertly 
shows us that a great deal of the material world is beyond 
ou r control and contrary to our desires. 
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